<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/"><channel><title>Episteme · Maskat</title><description>New writing by Maskat on the Episteme blog.</description><link>https://epistemejamia.in/contributors/maskat/</link><language>en-in</language><atom:link href="https://epistemejamia.in/contributors/maskat/rss.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><copyright>© 2026 Episteme, Department of Political Science · Jamia Millia Islamia</copyright><managingEditor>editor@epistemejamia.in (Episteme editors)</managingEditor><lastBuildDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</lastBuildDate><item><title>On the Phoenix That Is Feminism</title><link>https://epistemejamia.in/blog/on-the-phoenix-that-is-feminism/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://epistemejamia.in/blog/on-the-phoenix-that-is-feminism/</guid><description>Does gender equality need a different justification than liberalism? A radical feminist argument, drawing on Hirschmann, Crenshaw and Young, that liberalism cannot account for social construction or for intersectional oppression.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Does gender equality require a different justification than liberalism, or is feminism best understood by thinkers of global justice as a form of liberalism? I must admit, I do not think highly of liberalism so I would hope that the radical feminism in my mind by definition incorporates a more inclusive, critical, analytical, progressive and frankly intelligent starting point for not only sex or gender (I use these terms interchangeably) equality but a totalising justice. Liberal frameworks promise gender equality through equal rights, formal non-discrimination, individual freedom from external interference, individual rights protected by the rule of law. Liberalism functions as if it were centered around a single axis of equality. The problem with the framework as identified by countless feminist, anti-racist, post colonial, marxist and critical theorists is that its premise rests on a conception of the self and of freedom that was never built with the marginalised in mind and even less so with women whose oppression compounds across race, class, caste, religion, sexuality or occupation. I will be arguing in this response that gender equality requires a fundamentally different justification than liberalism alone because liberalism’s foundational assumptions are masculinist, individualist and structurally incapable of accounting for either the social constructedness of individual identities or the intersectional nature of oppression. Hirschmann’s &lt;em&gt;The Subject of Liberty&lt;/em&gt; (2003) and Crenshaw’s “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex” (1989) highlight the direct drawbacks of liberalism and liberal feminism respectively by arguing how the very categories or identities are not only constructed but constructed as unitary in a manner that renders invisible the compounded intersectional oppression of women. This is why individual rights protected by rule of law in a patriarchal world with paternalism and masculinist logic underlying the very categories or rights, laws as well as its structures and institutions is not enough. What accounts for the way power operates on women in the private sphere that defines their participation publicly? Who accounts for liberal feminism’s paternalistic isomorphism? These shortcomings call for a more radical approach (a more radical feminism) that incorporates difference, intersectionality and what Young calls the “seriality” of gender.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hirschmann’s analysis makes this need clear from the outset. The dominant liberal theories she analyses like Berlin’s positive/negative liberty dichotomy or the “responsibility view” of liberty by theorists like Miller, Benn and Weinstein among others which “can be seen as extremely expansive as well as highly political, for what constitutes a barrier will turn on our views of moral responsibility” and all require that a barrier to freedom be traceable to a deliberate, identifiable agent (Hirschmann 2003, p. 18). Flathman, for instance limits relevant barriers to “obstacles deliberately placed or left by other intentional or purposive agents” which means that structural conditions of patriarchy, poverty, race, normalisation of male violence or even gender norms do not merit in our collective consciousness as constraints on freedom at all (Hirschmann 2003, p. 17).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The examples Hirschmann starts with such as women’s fear of going out at night, the battered woman who adapts her behaviour to avoid triggering assault from the assailant at home, Mrs. Bridge who cannot bring herself to call for help while she freezes to death, are all making free choices in this liberal framework. How power works to manipulate these choices is, again, not even considered. This inherently masculinist logic operating in widely renowned philosophers and scholars is identified by feminists as far back as Wollstonecraft in &lt;em&gt;A Vindication of the Rights of Woman&lt;/em&gt; (1792) as nothing but an absurd paradox. Commenting on the “natural tendencies” of women identified by Rousseau (who was himself critical of liberal individualism yet the patriarchal conditioning survived) in &lt;em&gt;Emile, or Treatise on Education&lt;/em&gt; (1762) she rightly points out “the absurdity, in short… is so unphilosophical, that such a sagacious observer as Rousseau would not have adopted it, if he had not been accustomed to make reason give way to his desire of singularity, and truth to a favourite paradox” (Wollstonecraft 1975, p. 42). The systemic operation of patriarchal power and domination, the way it shapes desire, conditioning of self conception and the very choices women can imagine for themselves is what liberal theorists cannot explain as victims of this logic themselves. No doubt we have certain ideals of a free and equal life that liberalism gave us language for, but these ideas are narrowed by the liberal theorists unaware of their biases. In no way must we be restricted by liberalism to outdo it in its own game. We can imagine a totalising revolutionary system were it not that liberalism held us back or ironically enough its liberatory potential being destroyed by its being co-opted by capitalism. Clara Mattei’s remark keeps ringing in my ears: “moments in which people challenge [the] order, liberals and fascists are great allies”.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anyway, back to our point of contention, granting women formal legal equality changes less than liberals expect it to because as Hirschmann puts it, the issue is not only what women are allowed to do but “what they are allowed to be, how women are able to think and conceive of themselves, what they can and should desire” (Hirschmann 2003, p. 11). The self who exercises liberal freedom or rights is already produced and constructed within relations of power. A woman who has internalised the terms of her own subordination does not even experience the terms as constraint. I must reiterate that liberalism and its proponents are subject to this social construction as well and hence, liberalism’s conception of the choosing subject being a pre-social individual whose desires are essentially prior to and independent of the structures governing her life are assumptions that do not merit consideration in feminism. Feminist theory by contrast, starts from the recognition that there is no such choosing subject; choice is always constituted through context and in a patriarchal context this constitution systematically works against women.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Crenshaw shows how the very logic of single axis equality that structures liberal doctrines and its offshoot feminism (i.e., a liberalism derivative) theoretically erased the experiences of Black women (and by extension of her concept, of marginalised women).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Title VII cases she uses to illustrate difficulties with the judicial system’s treatment of intersectionality directly challenge the assumptions and logic of liberalism (Crenshaw 1989, p. 141). In &lt;em&gt;DeGraffenreid v. General Motors&lt;/em&gt;, the court refused to recognise intersectional discrimination against Black women because General Motors had employed white women before 1964 and Black men separately. The reasoning was that no discrete axis of discrimination could be identified because they “did hire women – albeit white women – during the period that no Black women were hired, there was, in the court’s view, no sex discrimination” (Crenshaw 1989, p. 142). Complaints of race discrimination were also dismissed, “the court apparently concluded that Congress either did not contemplate that Black women could be discriminated against as “Black women” or did not intend to protect them when such discrimination occurred” (Crenshaw 1989, p. 142). As Crenshaw writes, this “implies that the boundaries of sex and race discrimination doctrine are defined respectively by white women’s and Black men’s experiences” (Crenshaw 1989, p. 143). The paradigm of sex discrimination is white women’s experience while the paradigm of race discrimination is Black men’s prerogative. Black women whose discrimination and oppression operates at the intersection of both find neither category fits them, so legally they did not exist as a discriminated class at all. In other cases (such as &lt;em&gt;Moore v. Hughes Helicopter&lt;/em&gt;) Crenshaw identifies how white women claiming sex discrimination did not need to specify their race since race does not disadvantage them. Moore (a Black woman) was denied the right to represent all women in her sex discrimination claim because she had claimed discrimination as specifically a Black woman and not “as a female” (Crenshaw 1989, p. 144). This is the structural problem with liberalism applied to feminism. In liberalism equality is measured against a standard that is always already the experience of the most privileged member of the group. She also spoke of how laws against rape were historically only meant to protect the property like ownership of white women’s chastity while Black women were considered promiscuous to begin with hence, not subject to rape which reminded me of such comparisons drawn in the Indian caste system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Crenshaw (and Patricia Hill Collins and bell hooks) also wrote about how even in the anti-racist movement for emancipation of Black people, the collective liberation was prioritised over Black women’s liberation. So whose liberation was it really? Black women’s rights remained perpetually ignored and suspended, they were expected to stay silent about their struggles lest their claims justify racism, as are women and minorities in all marginalised communities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Liberalism is built upward from the most privileged, it takes the pre-social individual as its primary foundational block. The vantage point of the marginalised and most burdened by intersectionality is rendered invisible. If the category of an “individual” in liberalism is effectively filled with the experiences of privileged bourgeois/white, heterosexual men and the category of women is filled by experiences of bourgeois/white, heterosexual women, or even the least privileged heterosexual men of a marginalised community then the liberation being sought is only ever partial. The structures most responsible for the deepest oppressions remain ingrained in the theories as well as the “just institutions” being sought by them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;None of this means that feminism cannot be universal. It only means that universality should not be grounded in liberal fiction of equal individuals before the law or a shared identity but in a shared structural relationship to the conditions that produce subordination. For illustration, Young’s (1994) concept of women as a “series” positioned in common relation to gendered structures like gendered division of labour, gender norms, material conditions, domestic violence etc., instead of a unified group with common psychological traits or a shared identity. We don’t need to share identities or cultures or experiences to know what is unjust. Ideas of equality and emancipation and freedom did not originate in a geographical location and do not belong to any one group, race or ethnicity. Dismantling these unequal structures is the goal of the universalist, feminist project but one that accounts for difference. Difference being used to romanticise domination by scholars like Saba Mahmood or the left infantilising certain cultures is another question altogether and so deficient that they do not even merit serious counter-argument. The liberal framework might not be entirely detached from feminist goals but in Crenshaw’s words “the entire framework that has been used as a basis for translating “women’s experience” or “the Black experience” into concrete policy demands must be rethought and recast” (Crenshaw 1989, p. 140). Now, the question might be, what do we do next? I propose we build a more rigorous and robust theory that not only deconstructs the sex/gender dichotomy or describes intersectional experiences but provides a diagnosis of power these experiences are wrought with, then build a normative account of what is owed for a truly just socio-political order. One where no one’s freedom comes at the cost of another’s subordination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id=&quot;references&quot;&gt;References&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Crenshaw, Kimberle. 1989. “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics.” &lt;em&gt;University of Chicago Legal Forum&lt;/em&gt; 1989 (1): 139–167. &lt;a href=&quot;http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1989/iss1/8&quot;&gt;http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1989/iss1/8&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;François, Myriam. 2026. “Clara Mattei: capitalism is not natural – it’s enforced.” YouTube. &lt;a href=&quot;https://youtu.be/9M_dq_0ljsc&quot;&gt;https://youtu.be/9M_dq_0ljsc&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hirschmann, Nancy J. 2003. &lt;em&gt;The Subject of Liberty: Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom&lt;/em&gt;. Princeton University Press.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Wollstonecraft, Mary. 1975. &lt;em&gt;A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: An Authoritative Text, Backgrounds, Criticism&lt;/em&gt;. Edited by Carol Poston. Norton.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Young, Iris M. 1994. “Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective.” &lt;em&gt;Signs&lt;/em&gt; 19 (3): 713–738. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.jstor.org/stable/3174775&quot;&gt;https://www.jstor.org/stable/3174775&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;First published on &lt;a href=&quot;https://epistemejamia.in/blog/on-the-phoenix-that-is-feminism/&quot;&gt;Episteme&lt;/a&gt;, The Political Science Magazine of Jamia Millia Islamia.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded><dc:creator>Maskat</dc:creator><category>Feminism</category><category>Political Theory</category><category>Global Justice</category></item></channel></rss>