Hegel’s essay on love, written around 1798, at least a year before The Spirit of Christianity, is a text that initially reads as though it is meandering. He moves from religion and community to a definition of selfhood, its relationality and its materiality, without any obvious linear progression. But the movement is deliberate. His central problem is a social and political one: how does an individual belong to a collective without being destroyed by that belonging? Within his historical setting, a person’s worth was derived from property, and the sacrifice of property would mean the loss of worth, resulting in self-contempt. The question then becomes twofold: how do you have genuine community without sacrificing individual freedom, and how do you have genuine individual freedom without destroying community? The standard answers, whether contracts, laws, or religion, were unsatisfactory to him. He arrives instead at love as a genuinely living bond, though Judith Butler notes that this concept was later silently absorbed into his writing on Geist or spirit. Love here is not something exclusively between two people. It concerns the structure of social and political existence more broadly, and Hegel’s central preoccupation is how any form of collective life can remain animate rather than dead.
Butler makes a pointed observation about the form of the essay itself. Hegel writes in declarative sentences, but they argue that his prose structure mirrors what love does: you assert something, it gets destabilised, and the destabilisation was already hiding inside the original assertion. The German word they draw on is Unruhe, meaning restlessness or unrest. He gives you a point of view and the next argument simultaneously builds on it and undermines it. This formal quality is not incidental to the essay. The way it moves is inseparable from what it is arguing.
When Hegel arrives at what real love is, he describes it as a living union between equals, neither of whom is dead to the other. The question this immediately raises is what deadness means within his framework. Death here is not morbid or obviously negative but specific. Deadness enters a relationship whenever there is something outside the living exchange between two people that cannot be fully absorbed back into that exchange, and he identifies two forms through which objects die: property and sacrifice. He describes love as a feeling that exceeds singularity, one in which the point of view shifts from that of the living to that of Life itself. Life disperses itself in a manifold of feelings and is eternal. It exceeds the singularity of the perspective of the living beings it inhabits, such that the initial dyadic couple form dissolves into a larger process of Life that neither person controls. The other is not Life itself, since the other is finite, mortal, material. You sense what is living in the other precisely because you are separate from them.
This generates an apparent paradox. Despite love being held up as the exemplary instance of true union, separateness is not only preserved within it but is structurally necessary to it. For Hegel, however, this is not a contradiction. If there were no separateness, there would be nothing to overcome, and love is essentially the movement of overcoming separation while retaining it. Without two genuinely distinct selves, you do not get union but mere fusion or absorption, one self dissolving into the other, which Hegel regards as a kind of death of self rather than love. He states that in love the separate does still remain, but as something united, and he acknowledges a kind of antagonism between complete surrender, understood as the only possible cancellation of opposition, and a still subsisting independence. A love without separateness would regress into what he calls the lifeless: a unity that has no internal differentiation, no tension, no dynamism. Love is therefore an instance of a much larger movement of Life that neither person controls or fully comprehends. Butler labels this the personification of love. Life exceeds the dyadic couple. Love is an instance of Life but Life is not exhausted by love. Hegel says Life takes on a duplicate form in love, getting embodied in the figure of the person you love, so that you see Life reflected in them.
Butler quotes him directly: “to sense what is living in the other.” This phrase, which also becomes the title of their essay, condenses the argument. Sensing requires separateness. If you merged completely into the other, there would be no sensing, only identity. The gap between two people is not a failure of love but its condition, or rather a constitutive characteristic of it. Butler then asks whether sensing life in the other is only possible under conditions of equality, and whether treating the other as unequal is a way of deadening them. The answer would seem to be yes. Deadening in the contemporary world is structural if not always personal. Every encounter positions living beings under categories that fix their positions and deaden them in the eyes of whoever is doing the categorising. Butler also points to an obstinate materialism running through Hegel’s thought at this stage. They track his treatment of bodies as matter and how lovers intend to negate the difference created between them by matter, in order to achieve the dictum that in lovers there is no matter. Butler reads this as one of his characteristic declarations, built on the previous argument and yet simultaneously demolishing it, and grimly observes that the only way to fully negate material difference is by committing murder or suicide. The logic pushes toward its own impossibility.
Hegel then introduces indignation and shame, and crucially these are attributed to love itself rather than to the lover. Love is indignant if part of the individual is severed and held back as private property. This raging of love against exclusive individuality produces shame. The hostility is not a failure or a corruption of love from outside but is internal to love. Love rages against the very separateness that makes it possible, and this rage turns to shame because to rage against the other’s individuality is to attack the very person you love. The moment love recognises what it is doing, striking at the beloved, the rage becomes shame. Philosophically, shame is relational: we see ourselves from the perspective of the other. In the context of love, it emerges because love raged against the other’s separateness, attacked the beloved, and then became conscious of what it was doing. It is what happens when the lover realises that their love has become loveless. Butler also identifies an ambiguity in the passage: whose loving heart is being injured? The one who rages, or the one who is raged against? They argue it is necessarily both. At the moment of attack, the loving heart stops being loving. It becomes a deadening force, treating the other as property, as something it has a right to possess and control.
During his treatment of shame, Hegel introduces tyrants, sex workers, and vain women as figures of lovelessness. Butler pauses at length here to ask whose shame is being described and through what logic. They work through several possibilities. Are women tyrannical because they sell or use their bodies? Or are they figured as subject to a tyrannical force, not as agents of tyranny but as its objects? A tyrant, Butler notes, imposes his will absolutely, treating others as subordinates, as chattel, as property, and is therefore the ultimate figure of someone who deadens the other, who refuses to recognise the other’s living individuality. Butler interprets Hegel as associating shame with any situation where bodies are instrumentalised for the will of another. The sex worker’s body is used for someone else’s gratification, treated as a means rather than as a living being. The tyrant uses other people’s bodies as property or slave labour. The vain woman who aims only to fascinate is read more ambiguously: is she exercising power, or is she caught in a structure where her value is entirely located in her effect on others, making her own subjectivity secondary? In all these cases, what you have is love taking the form of inequality and subordination, and where there is inequality and subordination, shame follows. Butler closes by observing that this shame seems to be part of the practice itself, but also follows from an aggressive, subordinating, instrumentalising dimension that is internal to love, describing a structural tendency within it, the way love’s own logic can slide into tyranny when equality breaks down. They also note, without dwelling on it, that the women in Hegel’s examples are barely individuated. They are types, figures, almost allegories rather than persons, used to make a philosophical point without any real engagement with their actual situation or perspective.
Returning to the problem of bodily separation, Hegel is aware that this cannot be eliminated but that its suspension is possible. His answer involves a certain kind of touch and contact: forms of physical exchange where giving is enhancing and receiving is itself a form of giving, not possession or instrumentalisation but a reciprocal, living exchange. This results in an offspring, something of both people and yet beyond either of them. The two bodies achieve unity for a period, and with the birth of a child the initial dyadic structure becomes a triad, though this too is ephemeral. Even after all of this, the sensing, the touch, the child, property remains. What each person owns, what rights they have, whether one has something the other does not, all of this introduces deadness into the relationship. Butler reads Hegel as suggesting that ownership cannot be rightly reconciled with love. He rules out shared property as well, because to relate to someone through property, even shared property, is to relate through the medium of dead objecthood, substituting a thing for an encounter. The fragment ends without a resolution: love cannot survive property, marriage introduces deadness, and even children extend separateness rather than resolving it.
Butler draws on a separate text, the Fragment of a System written in 1800, to take the argument further. In that essay Hegel investigates what keeps alive that which is living in love and what is infinite in Life. He proposes that God is the name for all those relations that are living relations, that is, relations without deadness. God functions as a placeholder for a kind of relation that has not been killed by property, law, or possession, a relation that remains animate. And crucially, God cannot be reduced to a set of merely conceptual laws. Laws freeze living relations into dead formulas, describing how things are permanently and universally, regardless of context. For Hegel at this point, anything that fixes and freezes is a form of death, and what he is looking for is an animating law that does not freeze but enlivens. Before introducing his alternative, Butler makes a striking remark about philosophy and the act of philosophising. If love is infinite life, then philosophy is a problem, because the act of conceptualising, analysing, and fixing something in language is itself a form of deadening. Reflection stops time. It takes what is living and fluid and gives it a finite, static form. The true infinite is therefore outside the reach of reason. Butler attempts to rescue philosophers from this conclusion by proposing that philosophy is simply the messenger who brings us the invariably bad news about love.
In an attempt to imagine an operation of love beyond the dyad and property, Hegel turns to dance. He argues that worship, as a religious practice at its best, is neither purely intuitive nor purely conceptual. It is a joyful subjectivity of living beings, of song and bodily motion, that can become, through rules, objective and beautiful, like dance. Butler finds this remarkable. Dance is rule-bound: there are patterns, rhythms, structures you follow. And yet nobody who is dancing well is consciously obeying rules. The rules have become embodied, living, inseparable from the movement itself. Dance is what an animating law looks like in practice. His animating law operates something like a dance, understood as a rhythm between a finite series of sequences, spatially elaborated in time, and that which cannot be captured within those terms. Butler connects this to Hegel’s description of the Bacchanalian revel in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, where Hegel writes that the True is like a revel in which no member is not drunk, and yet because each member collapses as soon as they drop out, the revel is also transparent and simple repose. The Bacchanalian revel is total, ecstatic movement. Everyone is intoxicated, spinning, caught up in something larger than themselves, and no single person controls or comprehends it from outside. And yet it has a kind of stillness at its centre, not because it stops, but because the movement itself is the stability. Butler reads this as Hegel’s image of what living truth looks like: not a fixed proposition, not a dead law, but a movement that includes and requires the passing away of each of its moments.
Butler also draws on a separate fragment in which Hegel acknowledges the infinite grief and the whole gravity of the spirit’s discord, and they ask whether there is any way out of this, whether mournfulness is simply the permanent condition of anyone who thinks seriously about love. They find something in Hegel that gestures toward an answer. Mourning the loss of possession can be the precondition of love itself. The act of owning something in order to rule out its disappearance is a phantasm. Possession does not prevent loss; it only introduces deadness into the relationship while you are still in it. Mourning, genuinely grieving the loss of what you thought you possessed and giving up the fantasy that possession protects you, is the undoing of that phantasm, and that undoing makes space for something living. Butler ends their essay with an image that is almost shockingly concrete after all this abstraction. They say that if there is an infinity, it is found rustling among the abandoned clothes and old stuff accidentally bequeathed by the dead. When someone dies, their possessions, which were property, which introduced deadness into their relationships while they lived, are now nobody’s property. They are just things, rags, old stuff accidentally left behind. And then perhaps some other body picks them up, wears them, moves in them. Something of the dead person becomes animate again, not through possession but through use, through being taken up into a new movement. Butler calls this evanescent and alive: fleeting and living at the same time, and this is their image of what infinite life actually looks like.
Taken as a whole, Hegel’s essay on love is fundamentally about how property kills love, and in this sense it reads as a proto-Marxist critique avant la lettre. Even at this early stage, Hegel sees that property relations deaden human life. The diagnosis is truly remarkable. Any structure that organises human relations around ownership, whether religious, marital, or economic, introduces deadness, and this extends even to children. Love requires living exchange between equals. Property is the structural negation of that.
References
Butler, Judith. 2012. To Sense What Is Living in the Other: Hegel’s Early Love / Fühlen, was im anderen lebendig ist: Hegels frühe Liebe. 100 Notes – 100 Thoughts / 100 Notizen – 100 Gedanken, Nº066. Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz Verlag.
Hegel, G. W. F. 1797/98. “Love.” Translated by T. M. Knox. In Early Theological Writings. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Transcribed by Kwame Genov, 2017. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/love/index.htm